The outbreak of Covid19
a year ago intensified the debates about regulation of Artificial Intelligence.
Given the role of AI technologies in fighting the pandemics, the attention of
all stakeholders to its impact, both positive and negative, was all too
obvious. As a result, the extensive use of these technologies by some
governments to control the propagation of coronavirus brought to light
controversial and disturbing aspects of AI. Human rights advocates and experts
sounded the alarm about large-scale use of the facial recognition AI
technologies for surveillance purposes. Beyond the pandemic situation, concerns
were also raised about military use of Artificial Intelligence and other AI
applications that could endanger privacy, amplify the polarization of societies
and empower the autocrats.
Those concerns are
raised periodically by members of the expert community and leaders of the
hi-tech industry. Take for example Elon Musk, who already in 2014 said to MIT
students: “I
think we should be very careful about artificial intelligence... I’m
increasingly inclined to think that there should be some regulatory oversight,
maybe at the national and international level, just to make sure that we don’t
do something very foolish.” However, the conference organized last week by the
Council of Europe showed that now senior government representatives of the
continent add their voices to those concerns, sending a clear message: Europe
will not sit idle in face of this challenge.
The
conference’s title “Human rights in the era of AI: Europe as an international
standard setter for Artificial Intelligence” embodies the essence of Europe's
ambitious goal. The conference was organized by Germany who took over the
presidency of the Council of Europe last November and announced that the
question of human rights and technologies will be one of its key priorities in
this role. German minister of Foreign Affairs, Heiko Mass, who opened the conference
set the tone for the discussions that followed when he declared, loud and
clear, that it is
for democratic parliaments and governments to decide on AI regulation.
Minister
Mass emphasized two major elements of the European strategy of AI. First, he
stressed the importance of developing Europe’s own capabilities in AI
technologies and announced that to achieve this goal the EU budget earmarked
200 billion euro for digitalization. The second element of the plan is to
establish European standards of Artificial intelligence that “can create benchmarks worldwide”. According to
him, the Council of Europe, working with European Union, possesses a
significant legal framework and instruments to address the problems of AI
regulation.
Beyond the operational
items of its AI strategy, the European vision of the “geopolitics of bits and
bytes” and “digital bipolarity” merits attention. German Minister of Foreign
Affairs describes the emergence of two poles of power around Artificial
Intelligence: the Chinese digital model that prioritizes surveillance, and the
heavily market-oriented Silicon Valley model. Instead of choosing one side in
this rivalry, Europe will be open to all partners who share the conviction that
AI technologies should reinforce democracy and human rights, not erode them.
Mr. Mass also had a message for the new US administration: while expressing
hope that President Biden will be a partner to his vision, he asserted that
“... we shouldn’t wait
for Washington. Our ambition
must be to continue building our own European digital model that puts humans at
the center, remains open to the world and protects our values and democracy.”
The contours of the
European digital model for AI regulation were first formulated in European
Union’s Strategy for AI in 2018. In November 2019 the Council of Europe,
another European multilateral organization, headquartered in Strasbourg and
whose raison d'être is to safeguard democracy, rule of law and human rights in
Europe, entered the fray and established a special ad-hoc Committee on
Artificial Intelligence (CAHAI). Aside from expertise in human rights
protection, the Council of Europe’s additional advantage in
forging all-European consensus around AI regulation comes from its
significantly larger membership. All European states, with exception of
Belarus, are members in the Council, including Russia and Turkey; countries
outside Europe also joined CAHAI as observers, among them USA, Canada, Japan
and Israel. In December 2020 the CAHAI published a feasibility study, which
provides concrete recommendations to the Council of Europe on regulation of AI
technologies.
The major conclusion
of this feasibility study, which was also presented in the conference, is that “an
appropriate legal framework will likely consist of a combination of binding and
non-binding legal instruments that complement each other”. The report further
elaborated the role of binding regulations:
“Any binding document,
whatever its shape, should not be overly prescriptive so as to secure its
future-proof nature. Moreover, it should ensure that socially beneficial AI
innovation can flourish, all the while adequately tackling the specific risks
posed by the design, development and application of AI systems.”
In my conversations
with representatives of national delegations to the Council it was quite clear
that most of them agree with the emerging approach on AI regulation, even if
some had some mild reservations. This impression was reinforced also at the
conference where an absolute majority of the panelists, including CAHAI
experts, agreed on the need to establish binding regulation. Interestingly, the
only voice of dissent came from a representative of Japan who expressed concern
about the negative impact of regulations on innovation. And yet, the prevailing
opinion of the experts refused to see the contradiction between ethics and
innovation, spoke in favor of binding regulations, while admitting that
socially beneficial innovation should enjoy more flexible regulation.
The work of the Committee will
continue throughout 2021 with the goal to complete its mission by the end of
the year. The Council’s goal of setting European standards for AI is ambitious.
However, its determination to establish a European digital model looks stronger
than ever. Its sense of direction and destination is admirable. Considering
this, it would be sensible for like-minded countries outside of Europe to join
the discussion and address together legitimate concerns and differences of
opinion. Time is of the essence.
What can we learn from international organizations’ resolve to regulate AI Part I
I planned to write this article long before the global outbreak of
COVID-19. When I started six months ago my new diplomatic position representing
Israel at international organizations based in France, I was surprised to
discover how much importance all of them - OECD, Council of Europe, UNESCO -
relate to Artificial intelligence, and especially to its regulation and ethics.
As I embarked on more extensive research, I realized that this issue has become
for multilateral diplomacy both an unavoidable item on their agenda and a
reputational gold mine.
As I contemplated this, I suddenly found myself in a new reality
of “confinement” decreed in France and almost elsewhere in Europe. A reality of
social distancing, of closed restaurants, cafes and theaters (in Paris - can
you imagine that?), of frightening reports of the numbers of infected and dead,
of attempts, sometimes contradictory, sometimes desperate, by governments to
fight the pandemics. A reality where your only hope is for it to be over. What
sci-fi movies and dystopian literature showed us with such precision, is now on
full display as our everyday life. And the questions about AI and its ethics
are part of this reality, not just a fruit of sci-fi imaginary world.
So, I decided to go on with my article. After all, the best way to
deal with the quasi-dystopian present we live in is to focus on things that
will last beyond it. William Shakespeare wrote his immortal King Lear, Macbeth
and Anthony and Cleopatra during 1606 plague in London and Titian painted his
masterpieces in 16th century Venice stricken by plague. Let’s be inspired by
them. And of course, let us not forget that when humanity will turn the
coronavirus page in its chronicles, most of the challenges we dealt with before
the crisis will stay with us. Some of them will become even more compelling.
Artificial intelligence is probably one of them.
"Three laws of robotics", devised by the American science fiction author Isaac Asimov in 1942 story "Runaround"
Just look at the role of AI technologies during the ongoing
crisis. Using AI as well as other technologies of mobile surveillance Chinese
authorities were able to spectacularly enforce their confinement efforts. AI
was used by Chinese, Taiwanese and South-Korean governments to encourage
medical research and testing, while US, UK and other countries followed suit.[1] In my home country, Israel,
the technology was used, among other things, by Public Health funds to predict
the spread of COVID-19.[2] Recruiting AI technologies to
fight the virus was welcomed and at the same time met with growing concerns.
What implications will it have on our privacy, freedoms and rights as
individuals and on our society in general ?
In this context it is worth paying attention to the observation
made by Yuval Noah Harari, best-selling Israel’s historian, that many decisions
and social experiments that at normal times would have entailed long deliberations
and debate, were enforced on us during the COVID-19 crisis in a blink of an
eye. His assessment is that at least some of those decisions and experiments
would stay with us long after - due to their contribution in fighting the
virus.[3] There is absolutely no
doubt, AI technologies have the potential to be one of those irreplaceable
tools to deal with future pandemics and other crises of global proportions.
Their success and efficiency during the cataclysmic spring of 2020 (and
beyond?) will inexorably strengthen the appetite of governments, companies,
researchers and ordinary people for promising technology-based panacea. The new
push for AI technologies given an ever-growing recognition of its advantages
will predictably re-energize efforts to regulate it.
The need for regulation of AI technologies had come under the
attention of different players already 4 years ago, resulting in multiple
documents of principles and guidelines. We can expect that the upcoming debate
on AI will be informed by the work that has been done so far, so it’s worth
looking at it. Civil society and non-profit organizations, universities and
private companies were the first to identify the importance of AI regulation.
Among the first were Partnership on AI founded by Amazon, Facebook, and IBM; Future of Life Institute; Union Network International; and Tencent Institute
(China). These initiatives were followed by national governments’ reports
like “Preparing the future of AI” by US National Science and Technology Council
(2016) and “White paper on AI standardization” by Standards Administration of
China (2017). By 2018 it was finally the turn of international
organizations to embark on the issue and since then various multilateral
bodies added AI regulation to their agendas.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
was apparently faster than others, not only adopting AI Principles (May 2019)[4] but also moving towards
implementation of some of them. Thus, in February 2020 OECD’s AI Policy
Observatory was established with purpose to provide “evidence and guidance on AI metrics, policies and practices to help
implement the Principles, and constitute a hub to facilitate dialogue and share
best practices on AI policies.”[5]
OECD was not the first multilateral heavyweight to rise to the
challenge of AI regulation. In 2018 the European Union presented the European
strategy for AI, followed by the adoption, last February, of the White Paper on
Artificial Intelligence. UNESCO, the UN-affiliated organization based in Paris
and mandated to promote cultural and scientific cooperation, indicated its
interest in the subject publishing in 2019 a “Preliminary Study on the Ethics
of Artificial Intelligence” and launching in March its ad-hoc experts group to
draft “global recommendations on the ethics of AI”. Council of Europe (CoE), an
organization based in Strasbourg and convening 47 countries of European
continent (sometimes confused with European Union with its 27 members), opted
for establishing its own group of experts in December 2019; simultaneously the
Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE commissioned a few reports on the ethics and
impact of AI technology in the domains of labor force and health system.
Quite predictably, each one of these organizations aims
at highlighting its own vantage point or unique contribution it could make on
regulating AI technologies. OECD’s focus on “implementable and sufficiently
flexible” set of standards was devised to allow governments of its
member-states, representing the most advanced economies, to formulate better
policies on AI.[6]
The European Union's White Paper emphasized the need to define its own way,
“based on European values, to promote the development and deployment of AI”.[7] UNESCO, who joined the
discussion only recently and is aware of the work done by other bodies, argues
in its “Preliminary study” report that “there was a great heteronomy in the
principles and in the implementation of the values promoted” in documents
prepared by other organizations. According to UNESCO’s document “AI has
implications for the central domains of UNESCO’s work” and therefore its
“approach could be complementary at the international level to the OECD’s”. But
the goal set by UNESCO is far more ambitious: “by initiating a Recommendation, UNESCO
would be able to distinguish itself not only in terms of ethical content but
also through specific proposals to Member States”.
However, is the argument about “heteronomy”of guidelines and principles correct? And how significant are the differences between the
values formulated in them? Do they indeed necessitate the
growing number of principles and guidelines documents to regulate the use of AI
technologies? Part II
Let’s have a closer look at these documents and check their recommendations. The OECD recommendations highlight five basic principles for AI policies, namely they should promote inclusive growth, sustainable development and wellbeing; human-centered values and fairness; transparency and explainability; robustness, security and safety; accountability.[8] The European Commission’s 7 principles that laid the ethics basis of the EU’s White Paper are: human agency and oversight; technical robustness and safety; privacy and data governance; transparency; diversity, non-discrimination and fairness; societal and environmental well-being; accountability.[9] Out of fear to overwhelm the readers with reiterations, I will only add the third and last example of the set of AI principles from the UNESCO’s Preliminary Study: human rights; inclusiveness, flourishing; autonomy; explainability; transparency; awareness and literacy; responsibility; accountability; democracy; good governance; sustainability.[10] The AI principles from all three organizations could not look more coalescing, or even identical.
In fact, the consensus looks even more significant when we compare all known documents produced by other organizations and countries. One of the studies published in “Nature” last September made an inventory of 84 documents on AI principles and ethics (incidentally or not, the absolute majority of those documents originated in the USA and UK). The central finding in the research showed that in most of the documents the recommendations focused on “11 overarching ethical values and principles”.[11] The list of these principles is almost identical to those of OECD, EU and UNESCO. Another more recent study published by researchers from Harvard University have identified only 8 such principles, concluding that “the conversation around principled AI is beginning to converge, at least for communities responsible for development of these documents”.[12] In the world torn by geopolitical rivalries, could we expect that at least on AI ethics the global agreement is just around the corner?
As a matter of fact, a concern that it is rather a divergence, not convergence, that is underway was raised in both studies. In one of them the researchers wondered, in somewhat subtle form, why “despite the increasing visibility of AI in human rights'' the data they have gathered does not reveal a trend toward increasing emphasis on human rights. In a second article, the researchers have made an even stronger assertion: even though the numerical data indicates convergence between the values, in fact there are “substantive divergences among all 11 ethical principles in relation to four major factors: (1) how ethical principles are interpreted; (2) why they are deemed important; (3) what issue, domain or actors they pertain to; and (4) how they should be implemented”.[13]
The discussions on AI ethics and principles taking place at international organizations reveal the same differences that exist at any other discussion between representatives coming from different countries, cultures, faiths, practices, traditions and languages. The interpretation of values and their importance, as well as their context and ways of implementation are always dependent on these factors. When it comes to relations between states, all the above-mentioned differences are being complicated even more by competing national interests and by geopolitical considerations. States disagree on so many issues - on climate change, on immigration, on human rights, on democracy. How and why could they all agree on principles of use and development of Artificial Intelligence, one of the most promising technologies with a potential to change our lives almost in any aspect?
Therefore, UNESCO’s argument about “heteronomy” of principles is essentially correct, even though the true sources of it were misidentified in the organization’s report on AI. This source of divergence is not “the consequence of the definition chosen for AI or the objectives being sought”, as UNESCO contends, but rather of competing national interests, ideologies and geopolitics that prevent reaching such a consensus. It must be said, to UNESCO’s credit, that its report correctly recognizes those hindrances: it refers, for instance, to a political climate created by “non-transparency, biases or ways of acting by big companies, or the rise of popular mistrust in the face of cyber-attacks”[14]; furthermore, it alludes to tensions between the US and China, two major digital powers, that should be taken into account. These revealing remarks are valuable (especially given the fact that all the other documents discussed above ignored those concerns) in understanding how difficult - maybe impossible - will it be to reach consensus on AI principles. Consequently, the fundamental question is whether UNESCO, or any other international organization, can forge a global consensus on AI?
To answer this question, we should have a closer look at the functioning of international organizations today. They are considered as platforms where states promote their interests by creating coalitions and getting legitimacy for their acts and policies. Sometimes, states are not able to achieve their goals in existing organizations, so they create new organizations. Let's recall that in some periods of history, we had highly competing, or even hostile organizations - think, for instance, about the Cold War confrontation between NATO and the Organization of Warsaw Pact. The United States itself and its Security Council was a place of diplomatic warfare between the capitalist and democratic West and the socialist and authoritarian East. But even when the level of hostility in the world is relatively low, the competition between states still exists, and international organizations are just one of the battlegrounds. In fact, the recent years have indicated ever growing tensions as the US-centered system is being challenged by other players turning the international organizations, again, into the places of political confrontation.
From this perspective, the chance for the international organizations to find a common ground on AI looks dubious. UNESCO itself, who aptly emphasized the gravity of geopolitical concerns in this ethics driven endeavor, is not sufficiently equipped with international legitimacy to overcome the inevitable obstacles, as it lacks the membership of the US in its own ranks: two years ago the US and Israel left UNESCO precisely for its... excessive politicization. To overcome this hurdle the UNESCO expert group that was launched in March includes an American scientist. But the AI consensus there is still a very far cry. By contrast, OECD’s recommendations have better chances to serve as the policy basis for its member-states and other countries who joined the initiative. However, absence of China and Russia from OECD limits this effort only to the Western countries. The same constraint is shared by EU’s principles since its emphasis on European values will probably not make it an easy sell in other parts of the globe. The fact that the Council of Europe launched its own expert group on AI, a separate effort from that of the EU, could also potentially highlight the differences existing between western and eastern parts of the European continent.
It may well be that the efforts to reach a global agreement on AI would fail, as it happened with cyberspace regulation a few years ago. Therefore, the most effective way to proceed will be by consolidating the principles among like-minded countries and organizations associated with them. The example of OECD and EU indicates that it is possible to reach a consensus on recommendations and to start acting upon them. These organizations should engage other countries willing to endorse the AI principles, as it happens already with OECD’s recommendations. The urgent need for AI regulation cannot be dependent on reaching a global consensus - a noble, but thus far an elusive goal.
It’s hard to avoid a jubilant tone in speaking about Israel
and innovation when the first lunar spacecraft, made in Israel, is making its
way to Earth’s natural satellite. In the last 20 years Israel has become a
world leader in new technologies and science and there is no better proof to
this claim that the flight of “Bereesheet” (“In the beginning” in Hebrew, the
first words in Genesis) that started on February 22 and made Israel the 4th
nation in the world, after USA, USSR and China, who sent a spacecraft to the
Moon.
Some experts argue that the turning point for Israel’s
innovation was in the beginning of the 1990s, thanks to a successful professional
integration of the highly educated immigrants from former Soviet Union and as a
result of a new form of collaboration between academia and industry encouraged
by government. But the truth is that already in the first years after its
establishment Israel embarked on innovative solutions to problems that faced
many developing countries after the WWII and laid the foundations of its
successful journey to innovation… and to the moon.
Instead of looking back, let’s get a glimpse at new innovative
trends and solutions being developed in Israel these days. “An Overview of Innovation
in Israel 2018-2019” that was recently published by Israel Innovation Authority
and which I came across recently, could serve as a perfect guide. Here are a
few examples that caught my eye in this document:
Brain Therapy
The Israeli consortium “Brain Stimulation and Monitoring
Toolbox”, funded over the course of the past five years by the Innovation
Authority, was established in order to develop technological and scientific
infrastructure combined with neurological stimulation and monitoring to enable
personalized and improved treatment of neurological and psychiatric disorders.
The
consortium has had several groundbreaking achievements, some of which have led
to technological maturity and clinical execution. HaGuide, for example,
software developed by Alpha Omega and researchers from the Hebrew University
and Hadassah Medical Center, is used in DBS procedures (Deep Brain Stimulation)
performed on patients suffering from Parkinson’s disease or other disorders.
Another
technological and commercial achievement is a digital platform, for functional
brain imaging for psychiatric patients. The integration of the platform in
therapy is slated to advance personalized medicine and to offer support for
doctors’ treatment modalities.
Broadcasting sport events
The Pixellot startup established in 2013 has developed an
innovative system that allows production and broadcasting of a variety of
sports events with almost no human intervention. The system it developed
includes cameras, tracking capabilities, content manipulation through the
cloud, broadcasting to different devices, and exclusively automatic live-streaming,
allowing spectators to perform simple move manipulation – all at a low
production cost. Since its establishment, the company has already sold roughly
2,500 systems producing 20 thousand broadcasting hours a month.
AI at the service of public health
The national Digital Health Plan is striving to make Israel
a key player in the field of digital healthcare. To this end, in 2018, the
Authority launched a program for supporting pilots in the field of digital
healthcare that are either performed in Israeli healthcare organizations, or
that are based on capabilities or the data at their disposal. The Digital
Robotics pilot, which stands out among the pilots approved, has developed a
computerized system based on AI – the first of its kind – aimed at cutting
healthcare costs and improving service. The system, which is designed to be
used by medical teams, includes a personalized recommendation engine for
patients based on a broad clinical picture. In the context of the pilot
program, the system will first be implemented in two healthcare organizations:
Meuhedet Health Fund (one of the four Health Funds operating in Israel) and at
the Soroka Medical Center’s emergency center in Be’er Sheva.
Remote monitoring of cardiovascular diseases
Vectorious Medical Technologies was conceived in 2011 in the
RAD BioMed technological incubator backed by the Innovation Authority. The
company offered a groundbreaking solution for remote, continuous, precise, and
safe monitoring of patients suffering from cardiovascular disease – one of the
leading causes of death worldwide.The inimitable technology enables the implantation of a
microcomputer for battery free communication. Thus far, the company has raised
over $10 million, including a $2.25 million grant from the European R&D
program Horizon 2020 and the Innovation Authority. The exclusive grant has
helped the company recruit additional investors and accelerate development and
clinical trials. The company is currently conducting trials on human subjects
in Germany, England, Italy and Israel, on its way to receiving the necessary
regulatory approvals and to market the product. The company projects that the
development will reach the European market within roughly six months.
Operation of smartphones and tablets with head movements
The Sesame Enable startup, established in 2013, has
developed an exclusive app that allows people with mobility disabilities to
operate smartphones and tablets using head movements alone, using the device’s
front-facing camera. The company was awarded a substantial grant by the
Innovation Authority in collaboration with the national Insurance Institute, to
encourage the development of assistive technologies for people with
disabilities.
Solutions offered by the company are already in wide use
throughout the US, where the company receives government subsidies. Their
technology serves an audience with a wide range of mobility disabilities such
as spinal cord injuries, neuromuscular diseases, MS, and cerebral palsy.
Recently, the municipality of New York chose the company’s product as a
preferred solution for children with disabilities in the city’s public
education system, and negotiations are taking place with other US
municipalities and states to expand this activity.
The Golan Heights Winery’s innovative wine water
Golan Heights Winery ventured to develop a completely new
product: Wine Water. The project led to the construction of a concept based on
innovative technology: extracting grape waste reduced in the wine manufacturing
process and diluting it with water, so that the nutrients in grape peels and
the unique aroma and smell of wine are absorbed by the water. The product made
its world debut in July 2018 at the Fancy Food Show in New York and gained
unprecedented success, with hundreds of distributors from across the globe
seeking marketing rights for the product. It is already being sold by leading
chains in the US.
I gave you only a glimpse of the report, and you are welcome
to learn much more here: https://innovationisrael.org.il/en/report/innovation-report-2018 . More than any particular piece of technology, it shows a
deep commitment in Israel to ”perception that innovation is a key engine for
economic growth and wellbeing.”
The word “upcoming” at the title of this post is quite
misleading. In the last 2 to 3 years the problems associated with the
functioning of the existing social networks turned into a real snowball, or
even snow avalanche. A fusion of important political events (US Presidential
elections 2016, to take the most conspicuous example), as well as decisions
taken by the management of social networks themselves, exacerbated situation
and created a crisis. As a result, governments of many countries have taken
actions against the social networks practices, ranging from demands to change
the privacy policies to restrictions on access or complete ban of networks. But
the apex of this crisis is ahead of us.
I will argue here that while governments will try to exert a
greater control over the contents published on social networks, and while
social networks will be willing (or forced) to adopt their policies to these
demands, this one-sided, restrictive and “correctional” approach, will not be
able to solve the problems we face today. Governments should consider more
complex solutions, because this crisis is not only about social networks, but
about our society in general and democratic nature of our institutions and
political life. I will suggest one such solution further. But, of course, there
are more than one to envisage.
In fact, the problems with social networks began before the attempts
of meddling in elections or the role of social networks in phenomenon of “fake
news” were exposed. It started about 6-7 years ago when teenagers and even
younger kids started to complain about digital harassment they’ve experienced
on Facebook from their peers. Today we call this phenomenon cyber-bullying, but
back then nobody spoke in these terms. Back then, it was a problem for kids,
for their parents, and for teachers, but not something that was considered a
national or global problem. The next surprise we became aware of was our (lost)
privacy on the networks. That was already a reason for grown-ups to be
seriously concerned, but things got only much worse since then. After a short
period of grace and photo-ops with world leaders who were courting them, CEOs
and senior managers of Facebook, Twitter, Google and other companies, are now
being called to testify to US Congress and conduct nasty negotiations with governments
unhappy with their policies. In some countries there were no negotiations: they
were plainly banned.
What are the main areas of concern with social networks?
Social networks today are platforms for circulation of
hatred, incitement to violence, racist, xenophobic and antisemitic posts and
other versions of bigotry. Of course, it is not deliberate. Of course, it is
not their goal and design. Do you know the expression “the road to hell
is paved with good intentions”? Against their will, social networks became
global vehicles of hatred.
Last 5 months I spent in France. I could see firsthand how
social movement of "Yellow vests", that had legitimate demands from the
government, received massive support of the public (70%), and which organized
itself through Facebook, was hijacked by extremists, professional rioters and
thugs, as well as by provocateurs, racist and anti-Semites of all kinds. This
crisis proved once again (as if after the "Arab spring" we needed more proofs) the
power of networks to facilitate grass-roots protest movement, but at the same
time it exposed the levels of hatred, misogyny and antisemitism you wouldn’t
like to believe exist in France. Social networks were helpless in face of the
extremely violent discourse taking place on them.
Let’s refresh our memory: two years ago, Facebook founderwas talking about the new ambition for the network: to build more communities,rather than just encouraging connections between family and friends. Algorithms
went through a change, and the new approach implemented. Result? The infamous
“echo chamber” effect, that was already taking place in the world of partisan
media, was now in a full swing. Of course, nothing wrong if you have a community
of astronomers or poetry fans. But what about a community of bigots or
anti-Semites? They probably will not report “abusive posts” with racist and antisemitic
content, will they? By the way, the situation with other networks is not
better. You can easily find racist posts on Twitter or VKontakte.
This uncontrolled circulation of hate speech, bigotry and
incitement on social networks provided food for thought for some bright, but
vicious about using those networks to meddle in national elections campaigns, to
make “fake news” and to manipulate public opinion. These and other versions of
special operations on internet and social networks represent a new, digital
form of information warfare and are used by states against other states. In an
attempt to defend themselves in this digital jungle, social networks are trying
to develop better prevention policies. Facebook opens centers of moderation,
outside United States (one such center works in Barcelona) with help of experts who know foreign languages and are aware of local cultural
specifics which enables them to decipher complex social and political realities. But in the world of 196 states (and counting), hundreds of languages, of
growing complexity and diversity, of conflicting interests and contradictory
definitions of freedom and rights, how many moderation centers will they need
to open? And even then – how to moderate two billion Facebook users?
“There is no great thing that
would not be surmounted by a still greater thing.”
One of my favorite Russian poets, Kozma Prutkov (who was, in fact, a
fictional author), known for his satiric aphorisms and nonsensical expressions,
said : “Nobody will embrace the unembraceable”.
Social networks should become more modest about their ability to serve as a global
platform for creating communities; and they should be more thoughtful about
their social responsibility, when they act de-facto as media channel. I
believe, If they won’t adapt themselves, they will be simply forced by governments to do so.
But governments, and states in general, should understand
that this coercion will not help fix the problems of social media. At the end
of the day, social networks are platforms where modern societies function.
Social life is happening today also on social networks, more and more each
day, and this is irreversible. Social networks of today will disappear in the
future, only letting way for new networks to take their place. Therefore,
coercion and restrictions won’t solve the problem of social media.
This will also not solve another crisis, which is even more
important: the crisis of democracy and government in the digital age, where
social media plays such a central role. The governments should reinvent themselves
in order to stay legitimate in the eyes of their citizens, which means they
should better serve them. The modern technologies, including social media
technologies, provide tools to increase efficiency of governments. I believe governments
should create national public social networks. They will allow citizens
interaction between themselves and their government, where they are not
manipulated by anonymous players and secret influence operations. This network
will not be for profit, but only for the benefit of its users. Information about them
will not be sold to other companies. Users will be protected against hatred and
violence. Governments will be able to address the needs and concerns of citizen
through interacting with them on this network; and governments will also be responsible
for protecting the freedom of expression and a proper functioning of the
network, through public institution and other instruments under public
supervision.
The model of this network should be elaborated in more
details, but it’s clear to me that this is the future of any government if it
is determined to solve a crisis of its legitimacy and governance. Recognition
of this reality is imminent, and, of course, better sooner than later. Social media
is a good idea, but with crisis of private social networks we should take this
idea to a completely new level. As Kozma Prutkov said, “There is no great thing
that would not be surmounted by a still greater thing.”
A few days ago I re-watched a video that I was using
extensively in my presentations 8-9 years ago to promote the concept of digital
diplomacy. The name of the video was “Is social media a fad?” Apparently, since
2009, when this video was produced for the first time, the updated versions of
it, under the same title, were produced almost every year. When you watch those
videos, the bottom line is obvious: social media is not a fad. It is a new way
of communication, much more now than in
2009 (even though some of the social networks have proven to be a fad).
But is digital diplomacy a fad? When I asked this same question on
this blog 8 years ago, rather rhetorically, I truly believed it was not. Today
I think I should correct my opinion, and here is why.
Diplomatic outreach on social networks: numbers that show
nothing?
Digital diplomacy came into existence about 10 years ago
with the invention of social networks and appearance of a small group of
diplomats that wanted to introduce them into diplomacy. This innovative effort
has got different fancy names, among them Diplomacy 2.0, ediplomacy, digital
diplomacy, and that all sounded like a promise of a better diplomacy, of a new
way of conducting international relations and reaching out to new audiences.
Back then, in 2008, I was one of those enthusiasts who tried to introduce this
concept and encourage diplomats to adapt to a new – digital - world. After
returning from a post in California where I had my first experiences with
Facebook and My Space, I believed that the social media will open new
opportunities for diplomats and at the same time will revolutionize diplomacy
itself. Well, whenever you try to revolutionize something, you shouldn’t be surprised
that the first reactions to your ideas will be somewhere in the range between skepticism
and mockery. Some of my colleagues-diplomats look at the digital diplomacy as a
kind of a game that has nothing to do with diplomacy. Since then many of them
have changed their view. What was even of greater significance, Ministries of
Foreign Affairs of so many countries embraced digital diplomacy in their work. And
yet, 10 years into digital diplomacy “revolution”, it’s my turn to express some
skepticism about Diplomacy 2.0 and its unfulfilled promise.
To be absolutely frank, my first self-reflection was that
this attitude of mine could be one of the first signs of my aging… But when I
started to make a research on current status of digital diplomacy, I realized I
was not alone in this growing skepticism and the understanding that something
went wrong between diplomacy and social media. In fact, this concern is shared
by many practitioners and researchers of digital diplomacy. Look, for just one
example, what wrote in February Ilan Manor, one of the more prominent
researchers of digital diplomacy:
“Last week, when participating in a digital diplomacy
conference, I felt as if I had encountered the Battered Bastards of social
media. The conference, which was organized by the Dutch Foreign Ministry,
brought together diplomats and academics from numerous countries. Over the
course of two days, the participating diplomats repeatedly expressed their
frustration and disillusionment with social media and its possible utilization
in diplomatic activities. Understaffed, ill-equipped and facing growing expectations,
these diplomats are still active on social media yet without any strategy in
mind. They are online simply because one has to be online, they post because
everyone else is posting and they are communicating with that familiar, yet
unknown entity called “the public”. - https://digdipblog.com/, February 8,
2018
From personal experience I know that
if feels really good to use statistics about Facebook page or Twitter handle,
especially when it comes to reporting to the headquarters. I know how exciting
it is to see one of your posts or tweets going viral. The networks themselves
are going out of their way to provide you with accessible statistics about the
“influence” of your accounts, how many likes, interactions, impressions you did
on this post and on that picture. All those impressions look indeed very impressive.
But after 10 years of tweeting, “facebooking” and “instagraming”, how much diplomatic
goals where really achieved thanks to digital diplomacy? What are the new
audiences that were successfully reached out through social networks and did
you succeed to change their attitudes towards the country you represent? Did you really improve international
reputation of your country or its perception in the world with the help of your
digital diplomacy projects? And you know what - what about the minimalistic
goal of all – were you better-equipped and successful at least in informing the
foreign public about your country’s policies using social media presence? On
all these accounts, digital diplomacy will get a “Fail” grade, with minor
exceptions here and there.
Beyond this shared feeling – which is
so different from the excitement and enthusiasm of the first years of digital
diplomacy – there are real concerns, behind the numbers and statistics.It is important to say that these concerns
are coming primarily from diplomats and ministries that were the first-comers
into the field and who, till today, uphold the leadership positions in the digital
diplomacy world: US, Canada, Australia, Britain, Holland, to name a few. While
they are happy to report about growing numbers of the social media accounts of
their embassies and consulates there is also an understanding that these
numbers are not representing much. (For more explanation on problems with
Facebook and Twitter metrics read here:https://www.americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200112%20-%20Challenges%20of%20the%20Internet%20and%20Social%20Media%20in%20PD.pdf).The metrics can show you some general trend
about your audiences, but they don’t measure your real influence with them.
Why this does not work?
If you ask any diplomat today what
digital diplomacy means in practical terms he or she will tell you this: we should
have a Twitter account, a Facebook page and Instagram profile (and the more
advanced will add also LinkedIn), and we should post as much as we can and of
course keep in mind that we should “target” the right audiences. (It is
interesting to analyze why we are using a word from military jargon in this context,
but maybe in another article). To sum up this attitude – foreign ministries use
3 to 4 major social networks as a principal and, in most of the cases, the only
tool of their digital diplomacy. Is it the essence of the digital diplomacy,
really?
We tend to forget that private social
networks, such as Facebook, were created for social interaction between people,
not governments, some of them for more business-like communication, most of
them – for amusement. They suggested a new mode of communication, and gradually
started to replace traditional media as a source of information. But as private
enterprises they needed a successful business model that will allow them to
make money. So, they wanted everybody to enjoy free platform for communication,
amusement and information, while providing other businesses with information
about us as potential customers for businesses. Governments, that were not the
primary targets for the networks expansion, created their own profiles, both
institutional and individual, and discovered multiple advantages in their
presence on the networks.
With this understanding, suddenly,
foreign ministries have fallen in love with digital diplomacy. Opening account
on Facebook or Twitter is so easy and - free of charge! Every embassy,
consulate, ambassador, every diplomat and international agency should open it! And
of course, Instagram – the more the merrier! Some foreign ministries, like in
UK, even encouraged their ambassadors to write blogs, which is a much more
complex and sophisticated operation than managing FB or Twitter account. And
the fact is that this symbiosis between diplomacy and major social networks is
coming to its full realization. This is so much so that in the near future we
can envisage in some foreign ministries establishment of Facebook departments,
Twitter bureaus, or offices for Instagram affairs. After all, governments are
bureaucracies that need to institutionalize their own activities. As a result, digital
diplomacy is preoccupied today with expanding audience and influence on
existing networks, using tools provided by those networks and within the rules
set by the networks; therefore, the emphasis is on sustaining presence, on writing
more attractive posts or tweets, on streaming more live videos, and on trying
to decipher the ever-changing and elusive algorithms of the networks.
The current model of digital diplomacy,
namely using major social networks, isn’t working and here is why:
First, the factor of freshness and
innovation was important when all this started. Foreign ministries and
embassies who were the first to open its pages benefit today from greater
numbers of followers and general attention, more than those who joined the club
later. Today, the effect of opening new diplomatic page for consulate or
embassy will be relatively insignificant among millions of accounts and
billions of posts and tweets.
Second, and more important factor was
that over the years the governments and foreign ministries began to realize
that this new mode of communication was not only about strengthening
democratization, expanding transparency, improving public services, about
branding and reaching out to new audiences. It was also about hate language and
obscenity, about security concerns and threats, about social protests and
violence, about reputational blows on the international arena, and lately about
fake news and meddling in elections. The major social networks became platforms
for spreading false information and are struggling to find mechanisms to deal with
defamation, radicalization, hate language, Holocaust denial and recruitment of
terrorists. There is no doubt, the major networks’ image and reliability is
compromised on too many levels, and, according to my assessment, we are just in
the beginning of this process, not in its end.
Third point: social networks encourage
a simplistic, superficial and emotional engagement that is beneficial to celebrities,
provocateurs and politicians, but is detrimental to diplomats or any other kind
of expert community. Diplomats will never be able to outwit on social media
those people or groups whose language is not limited by norms and national
interests, unless diplomacy will compromise its own goals.
And last point: in the current model of
digital diplomacy there is a hidden assumption that the major social networks
of today are eternal entities. Do you really think they are here forever? If
so, see all those networks that have disappeared in the last ten years. Fashions
change, trends reverse: social media is here to stay, but social networks
will fade away and give way to new ones. Look for example for a generational
change that is taking place today:https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jun/01/facebook-teens-leaving-instagram-snapchat-study-user-numbers.
Before we move to the next chapter, I want
to make it clear: I am not against the presence of foreign ministries on
Facebook or Twitter and I don’t even want
to say anything bad about social networks (I mean, I could, but not now), I
just want to say, very diplomatically, that governments in general, and
diplomacy in particular, simply cannot limit their embrace of the social media
to the major social networks. Their capability to have an impact there is
decreasing, and what is even more troublesome in my eyes - this pursuit after a better tweet and a “cooler”
post will have grave consequences and could compromise status of diplomacy as a
profession. If we agree about this common denominator between us, let’s have a
discussion about new models for digital diplomacy.
Looking through the "digital" glass ceiling
For the reasons stated above,
ministries of foreign affairs should carefully revisit their vision of digital
diplomacy and its implementation. They should keep their presence there, but
not dedicate its dwindling budgets and all of its digital work to the major
networks. They should rethink how goals of public diplomacy could be achieved
on the existing platforms, and at the same time to think how they could bypass
these platforms and bring the digital diplomacy to a broader digitalization, or
as Matthew Wallin hinted in his article:
What should be done to increase effectiveness
of digital diplomacy?
First, foreign ministries should not
use their accounts as bulletin boards while avoiding conversations with the
audiences they want to engage (“Australian digital diplomacy developments 2016”,
by Danielle Cave). When you look for new audiences you don’t bombard them with
your messages. Rather you start listening and respond to their concerns.
However, as I already explained, to do so on major social networks is becoming
more challenging.
Second, think outside the American networks.
Go to WeiBo or VKontakte, but don’t forget you have to be fluent in these
languages. Also, search for niche social networks, less-commercialized, more
community-oriented. Heard about Diaspora or Letterboxd? Check them out. As
PCMag puts it, “The future is in drilling down into niche social networks…
Instead of sites that are all things for all people, these networks are happily
staying small and serving only the folks who want to be there.” (https://www.pcmag.com/feature/353300/9-niche-social-networks-to-use-instead-of-facebook)
And finally, here is my central
suggestion: Ministries of foreign affairs should create their own social
networks - platforms for supporters of
their countries around the world. I think all of us will be surprised how much
support countries can get from the international audience. Many countries have big
diasporas worldwide and this phenomenon keeps growing. This is but one major
group of potential supporters for your country, many others you will be able to
discover when engaging them through social network dedicated to your country.
Today, all countries are competing for
better reputation internationally to attract investments and tourism, but also
to explain their policies and positions. Private social networks are not making it easier to implement these goals, quite the opposite. So, instead of working
only on major networks that became too monstrously big, attract both supporters
and detractors, and above all, set their rules, countries can establish virtual
platforms on the international scale, on its own terms, allowing engagement and
raising support for their policies.
The advantages of these networks are
obvious, but the opposition to this idea, of course, will be enormous. Some
people will say that the governments cannot allow a free dialogue about their
own policies, without being suspected of greater surveillance. I beg to differ.
The networks of today are already a kind of a Big Brother.Setting up some norms and rules will not
damage but rather help prevent inappropriate behavior that became so common on
existing networks. How can you trust the information on the networks that became
the very tools of “fake news” and manipulation? On the other hand, democratic
governments should put to test their ability to engage public in a transparent
and democratic way if we want to preserve the principles of democracy in the
age of social media.
By the way, there is nothing new about
niche social networks developed for or by public sector. Ten years ago, Govloop
and Ozloop were the first great examples of how public employees can engage
socially and professionally through the social media platform. Inspired by them
I tried to create the social network of the Israeli public sector (what was
good 10 years ago still makes sense - Workplace social network platform, that
was developed by Facebook, by the way, is now being used by the ministry of
social welfare in Israel). Back in 2010 I even had an idea of creating a social
network “My Israel” in several foreign languages, having the same model in
mind, but I just did not have time to dedicate myself to this project on my own.
This post is already too long, so let
me conclude it: I don’t think every ministry of foreign affairs would or could
launch international social network, even though technologies are already at
hand and the time is ripe. Why? Because such a move will entail a deeper institutional
reorganization, which of course will require courage and vision. However, given
a slippery road towards superficiality paved by social networks, more courageous
and sophisticated digitalization of the foreign ministries could be one of the
ways to overcome the ongoing crisis of modern diplomacy.
